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KIERKEGAARD'S CHRISTIAN 
JUDGEMENT ON ETHICS 
Jeremy \V i\LKFR 
I N this paper 1 want to ask what ethics means in Kierkegaard's thought. The 
range, and poetic subtlety, of his writings makes this pcculiarly hard to answer. 
And in a broad sense ethics is the central theme of all his thought. My question is : 
Can wc say anything that is sharper and c1earer than that? 
We must begin by accepting the division of his published wntmgs into two 
groups, the pseudonymous and the acknowledged. None of the pseudonyms (except 
Anti-Climacus) is a Christian; all the acknowledged works are expositions of 
Christian doctrine by a Christian, even if a soi-disant bad one. Sorne of the 
pseudonyms daim to be religious, but their religion is not the Christianity expoundcd 
by Kierkegaard. Nor is their understanding of religion the same of Kierkegaard's. 
Even "religiousness B" is very far indeed from Christianity as Kierkegaard himself 
understands and expounds it. From his point of view ail the pseudonyms, again 
excepting Anti-Climacus, necessarily misunderstand Christianity. If so, it is implied, 
they must necessarily misunderstand everything important about human existence. 
Now many ofthe pseudonyms talk about ethics. This idea takes the characteristic 
form in their writings of a particular stage, or mode of existence: the "ethical". Can 
wc, then, at least begin by establishing a dear meaning for the idea of the ethical as a 
form of Iife? 
Let us tum to the theory of the stages. 1 want to make a series of points about 
this theory. The first is that, strictly speaking, there is no one "theory of stages" in 
Kierkegaard. We have rather a number of different accounts of the stages by 
pseudonyms who are themselves represented as being at one stage or another. 
Admittedly these accounts show certain resemblances. They tend to agree in counting 
the aesthetic as the lowest stage, the ethical as the next stage, and the religious as the 
highest stage. They tend also to agree on the placing of intermediate activities. 
Metaphysics goes between aesthetics and ethics in several books: the group consisting 
of poetry, psychology, and dialectics is placed between the ethical and the religious. 
The pseudonyms tend to connect irony with ethics and humour with religion, as also 
melancholy with aesthetics and resignation with ethics. But these resemblances are 
only formai - not necessarily structural -, and do not warrant identification of 
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one and the sa me theory in aIl pseudonyms. This question cannat be decided before 
we have carried out minute rhetorical analyses of each and every text. For formaI and 
superficiallikenesses of doctrine may well mask real differences which are embodied 
in Kierkegaard's literary techniques. As an example, the word "repetition" is often 
used in connection with the idea of the ethical. But, 1 daim, by itself this Îs 
insufficient to prove doctrinal overlap. For perhaps the word is being used in 
significantly different ways, and only linguistic analysis can tell us whether this is sa 
or not. 
The second point about the "theory of stages" is that such a theory is nowhere 
presented objective/y. Since each pseudonym is himself at sorne stage, they can do no 
more than represent the stages as they appear from their own standpoints. Again, 
sorne appear to occupy roughly similar standpoints. For example, Repetition, Fear 
and Trembling, The Concept of Dread, the Fragments, and the Postscript are al! 
(whatever their differences) written from the complex stand point of the poet-
psychologist-dialectician. Now it is central to the theory of stages that, put crudely. 
things look different to individuals at different stages. So too for the stages 
themselves. So the idea of the ethical, for example, will take different forms for the 
aesthete, the metaphysician, the ethical man, the psychologist, and the Christian. So 
too will specifie ethical ideas, like dut y or marriage. (In fact the idea of the ethical is 
plainly described in two quite different ways in the pseudonymous books. One group 
uses concepts like "universal", "repetition", "dut y" ; the other uses concepts like 
"individual", "subjective", and "passion". And although there are verbal overlaps, it 
is plain that we have to do with specimens respectively of Hegelian and Kantian 
ethics.) 
The idea of a theory of stages came to Kierkegaard from Hegel's Phenomenology. 
It is axiomatic in Hegel that things look systematical!y different according to the 
thinker's mode of consciousness. But in Hegel there is also, beyond aIl particular and 
so distorting standpoints, an objective stand point. To the philosopher everything 
appears as it truly is. Kierkegaard foreeloses on this method of achieving objectivity, 
at least as regards forms of human practice, induding ethics. He does not merely 
think that no human being can occupy the standpoint of conscious eternity. It is 
rather that sorne aspects of human existence cannot be fully understood if understood 
as objective phenomena. Hegel's modes of consciousness and Kierkegaard's stages 
are simultaneously forms of theoretical reason and forms of practical reason. 
(Admittedly, we find in the Phenomenology what look like forms of pure theoretical 
reason, e.g., sense-certainty or scientific reason, and forms of pure practical reason, 
e.g., family life or romantic morality. But as Kojève has shown these are not actuaIly 
separable modes of thought or activity. For Hegel, the ide as of theory and practice 
are abstractions from a totality which is always necessarily both thought and 
practice). Now, according to Hegel forms of practice can be objectively understood, 
i.e., grasped theoretically, because they are implicitly themselves forms oftheory - or 
conversely because phiiosophical theory is itself the ultimate form of practice. 
Kierkegaard rejects any such assimilation. For him, modes of practice can be 
exhibited only in a human existence, not in a theory, and similariy can be grasped 
only through living and not merely through thinking. 
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Contrasting Kierkegaard with Hegel, we might say that the stages can be 
pr.:sented "ror themselves" and "for each other", but not "in themsclves" and "Cor 
us": and not "in and for themselves", thal is, Phenomenologically. Yct therc is still 
an analogue in Kierkegaard for the Phenomenological standpoint. and it is the 
eomplex standpoint 1 mentioned earlier, which wc might cali "poetic psyehology" or 
"psychological poet ry". This is unique in relation tu the slages, sinee one who 
occupies il is able to grasp the stages as they appear to themselves while seeing them 
l'rom olltside, even lhough he ean grasp them only imaginatively and not praetically. 
Kierkegaard's poet-psychologist, like Hegel's philosopher, is essentially a dialee-
tician. His dialectic resembles Hegel's in one crucial reature. In the Phenol11en%g~' 
\lié are shown how each mode of consciollsness embodies a finally incoherent set of 
concepts - an mconsistent picce of thenry and meta-theory. And wc are also shown 
how the incoherence of any conceptual scheme can be demonstrated l'rom wilhin 
itself. This is also true of the stages. The pseudonyms use their dialectic to create 
characlers (often themselves) who represent their stages 50 l'ully that they are on the 
edge of awareness of their own pending incoherence. Judge William's account of the 
ethical existence, for cxample, is so lucid that finally he l'uns up against the idea of the 
extraordinarius - an idea which is wholly inconsistent with the Judge's definition of 
ethics, and signais to the reader that this definition must be inadequate or incoherent. 
[1' Kierkegaard's dialectic resembles Hegel's in this important way, it also differs in 
threc no less crucial ways. It is not objective, but psyehological: it is not systematic, 
sinee it is not theoretical : and, for the sa me reason, it is not historical. Hence there 
could not be a Kierkegaardian Phenomenology, 
It is crucial that poetry, psychology, and dialecties are not autonomous 
standpoints in the way Hegel's "philosophy" is. Anyone can have aIl or any of these 
powers. They do not form a stage by themselves; rather, we should see them as 
techniques of understanding and representation available at ail stages, So, where the 
Phenomen%gy contrasts particular modes of consciousness with the philosophical 
consciousness, Kierkegaard contrasts modes of consciousness with their own poeticized-
psyehologized forms. So wc still do not find in Kierkegaard a phenomenology whieh 
is, like Hegel's, extcrnal and th us objective, 
Il 
We might argue here that, although there is no externally objective standpoint in 
the pseudonymous works, still there is one in Kierkegaard's total corpus: namely the 
Christian standpoint. But there is a difficulty with this daim, In the acknowledged 
writings there is no discussion of the theory of stages or any important part of il. But 
if Kierkegaard had thought that Christianity provided a standpoint from which the 
theOl'y of stages could be objectively analysed and refuted, he would surely have do ne 
so in his acknowledged texts. So on the surface it looks as if Kierkegaard himself did 
not see Christianity as dialectically related ta the stages in the way speculative 
philosophy in Hegel is dialectically related to the earlier parts of the Phenomel1%gy. 
l say more about this below. In anv case, although there is a sense in which for 
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Kierkegaard only Christianity possesses "the truth", this is not a sense of truth wich 
IS in any way objective except in that it is authoritative. 
Let us here consider the third point about the theory of stages; that it contains 
no kind of deduction of Christianity. Here again Kierkegaard's writings, even if 
phenomenological, are very un-Hegelian. For in Hegel the final stage of philosophy 
can of Ter an objective analysis of preeeding stages only in virtue of the faet that it 
derives itsclf dialectically from those earlier stages. 
In the pseudonymous books wc find certain typical distinctions between the 
ethical and the religious, and certain typical ways of conneeting them. Let us identify 
some of the distinctions. In Fear and Tremblinfi Johannes de Silentio argues that faith 
is a paradox. He does not mean that what the believer believes is paradoxical, except 
in the weak sense of "contrary to eommon sense"; he means that the condition, or 
ground, of faith is a paradox. For, from his quasi-Hegelian standpoint, it is sc1f-
contradictory that any individual should be related immediately ta God, and that this 
relationship should impose duties contrary to the duties of ethics. In the Fragments 
and Postscript Johannes Climacus argues that certain elements in what the Christian 
bclieves are paradoxical - in a rather different sense of paradox. This judgement, 
too, issues from an ethieal standpoint, although one that is quasi-Socratic. In The 
Concept of Dread Vigilius distinguishes two kinds of ethics, one based on metaphysies 
and the other on dogmatics and concerned with the concept of sin. Non-Christian 
ethics, according to Vigilius, cannot take account of this concept. To this list of 
distinctions wc might add Anti-Climacus' argument that Christ constitutes an 
"offence". Now what does such evidence show? It does not show that Kierkegaard 
himself thought Christian faith or ethics involved a "leap". It does nOl show that he 
thought Christian doctrine was self-contradictory. It does not show that the 
pseudonyms think Christianity as faith to be self-contradictory or as existence to be 
self-defeating. It shows only that, if one makes certain prior logical and ethical 
assumptions, one is debarred from adopting the Christian faith and embraeing the 
Christian ethics. 
If these distinctions suggest that there is no deduction of'Christianity from the 
ethical in the pseudonymous texts, whether the deduction is modelled on Hegel or on 
Kant, there are also certain connections between ethics and religion which the 
pseudonyms make in ways suggesting that sorne deduction of Christianity might be 
possible after ail. For example, in the second volume of Eirher/Or Judge William 
argues that the aesthetic existence unfolds into an inevitable des pair which can be 
overcome only by an act of "absolute choice". This defines an ethical existence 
which is, however, in the J udge's eyes at the same time es~entially religious and 
indeed Christian. In the Fragments Johannes argues that there is a natural dialectic 
within human reason which !cads reason to a point where it collides with something 
essentially beyond reason. 1 use the expression "natural dialectic" to bring out the 
Kantian ancestry of this argument. Again, in The Sickness [lnto Death Anti-Climacus 
constructs a concept of the self one of whose implications is that true selfhood is 
gained and known only in faith. 
Taking these typical pseudonymous positions together, the most wc can say in 
favour of a phenomenological deduction of Christianity from the ethical is this. If a 
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man is poet, psychologist and dialectician, his renections on aesthetic and ethical 
existence may lead him ta a point where he finds himself forced to creale a "poem" 
about human existence that, at the same time, he finds both incredible and 
impracticable. This poem is recognisable as a version of parts of the Christian faith. 
But il is clear how far this is l'rom a deduction of Christianity, if we remember that 
these pseudonymous presentations of "Christianity" are (1) poetic, (2) paradoxieal, 
and (3) hypothetieal. For the believer. of course, Christianity is not poetic, not 
paradoxical, and not hypolhetical. It might be replied that, even if Kierkegaard's 
"phenomenology" contains no deduetion of Christianity, at leasl il offers a kind of 
deduction of an image of Christianity. But this reply is no use. For what is it that is 
supposed to occupy the final stage ') A poem which even as a hypothesis is a paradox. 
But this is no more genuine Christianity, or even religion, than a poetie image of the 
ethicallife is a kind of ethical existence. Genuine Christianity is a way oflife; a faith, 
and moreover one which understands; and a commitment. So what is "dedueed" in 
the pseudonymous works is not and cannot be Christianity. 
III 
These arguments show that Christianity does not function in the pseudonymous 
corpus as the philosophical standpoint functions in Hegel; as a stand point which is 
both internai to the dialectic and objective in relation to the preceding stages. But it 
might still be the case that the Christian standpoint functions in Kierkegaard's total 
corpus as a standard by which the stages, including the ethical life, can be assessed. 
This brings me to my fourth point about the stages: there is indeed an implicit 
Christian judgement on the stages, and this includes the judgements that these forms 
of existence are essentially sin{u/ and accompanied by essentially corrupt modes of 
consciousness. And these judgements apply equally to the ethical stage. 
Now there is no single definition of the ethical in the pseudonymous corpus. 
Therc are a number of different partial indicators. These direct us towards three 
familiar kinds of ethical system: the Hegelian, the Kantian, and the Platonic-
Socratic. These are ail ethics of will and the will's law, although each offers a peculiar 
analysis of these concepts. For Kierkegaard, the Christian judgement too must be 
based on a Christian concept of will and morallaw. This concept necessarily refers us 
to the concept of divine grace. It is here that ail "ethical" standpoints stumble and 
fall. For, l'rom Kierkegaard's Christian standpoint, the natural will is essentially 
corrupt. Kierkegaard remarks that this possibility never occurred to Socrates, and 
that it is indeed something that cannot be handled within a Socratic framework. 
However a historian might reply that it certainly occurred to both Kant and Hegel, 
and that each tried to handle it within his own ethical and metaphysical system. This 
raises extremely complex problems, and what l now say merely scratches their 
surface. 
For both ethical systems, the crucial fact is that the operation of grace in human 
existence cannot be adequately acknowledged in either ethical system as an empirica/ 
reality. Consider Kant. In his Religion, we find a concept of radical evil. Kant uses 
this concept, inter alia, to distinguish two axes for the will: a weak-strong axis and a 
43 
JEREMY W ALKER 
corrupt-holy axis. Since these are distinct, we have a typology of four modes of will : 
weak and corrupt (everyday), weak and holy (the saint), strong and corrupt (the 
demonic), and strong and holy (the angelic). Kant recognises that the problem of 
ethies cannot be solved by moving from weakness to strength of will. It requires 
movement also from corruption towards holiness. Yet in Kant's own terms this 
movement can be represented only as a postulate of reason, and one which must 
always remain un intelligible to our understanding and unachievable by our own 
unaided will-power. The very terms of his metaphysies make it meaningless to speak 
of grace as empirically real. 
Again, in Hegei's system the corruption of the will is identified primarily as 
isolation of the particular will (spirit) from the Absolute Spirit. The will, perhaps, 
becomes holy insofar as it coincides with this Absolute Spirit. And it is Hegel's main 
objection to Kantianism that the latter made impossible this unification of the finite 
and infinite, a unification which is the he art of Hegel's whole philosophy. Now the 
finite will is reconciled practically with the infinite in fïnding its own substance in the 
objective forms of social existence; and it is reconciled theoretically with the infinite 
in finding its own creative subjectivity universalised in the successive absolute forms 
of art, religion, and philosophy. There is even an analogue in Hegel for the ide a of 
grace. It is the idea that Absolute Spirit is implicitly operative within ail finite modes 
of spirit, so that what a Christian calls the Divine Will is already implicitly at work in 
each human will. However, in Hegel ail these essential truths of Christian doctrine 
are re-presented in rational (dialectical) form ; and for this reason alone the Hegelian 
ethics is no less unsatisfactory to Kierkegaard than the Socratic and Kantian ethics. 
For Kierkegaard, the operation of divine grace, like everything characteristic of 
Chnstianity, is a matter of faith; experience, certainly, but the experience of the 
belicver alone. No dialectical argument for the operative reality of grace can 
reproduce the Christian's experience of its reality through his faith. Just as 
Kierkegaard says that God "exists" only for the beiiever, 50 grace can be experienced 
only by the believer. 
Now the experience of grace go es with another characteristic mark of Christianity: 
the experience of sin. Sin, too, cannot be experienced as real except by the Christian. 
That is, the essential corruption of the human will cannot exist as an ethical reality 
except within the Christian framework. So, Kierkegaard might have argued, a non-
Christian ethics is not only unable to resolve the problem of the will's corruption, it is 
unable to present this as a real problem. Therefore the fact that both Kant and Hegel 
tried to solve this problem, however laudable, shows only that their basic metaphys-
ical assumptions must be radically inconsistent with their ethical beliefs. A Christian 
ethics can no more be presented within a critical or speculative framework than it can 
be stated within the limits of Greek metaphysics. 
Now according to Kierkegaard corruption of the will implies corruption of the 
entire consciousness. This means that, from a Christian standpoint, the pseudonyms 
have a corrupt and false moral understanding. But they must also have a corrupt and 
false understanding of the ethical - of what ethics is, and what it means in the total 
universe of human existence. In the modern jargon, their meta-ethics too must be 
confused and inadequate. Among su ch confused meta-ethical beiiefs we might list the 
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following familiar pseudonymous c1aims: (1) Judge William's c1aim that the 
"either/or" in human existence is a choice between the aesthetic and ethical 
existences; (2) his belief that the ethical is the highest stage of human existence, and 
includes a religious existence in itself; (3) the common belief that the ethical life is 
inconsistent with the practical demands of Christian faith ; and (4) the common belief 
that the cthieal cxistcnœ is solely or mainly a function of inwardness. 1 would say 
that thcse specimen pseudonymous beliefs are, from Kierkegaard's own standpoint, 
not only l'aise but conceptually corrupt in ways following from corresponding forms 
of the will's moral corruption. 
We must remember here that the ethical is presented by pseudonyms. Now these 
pscudonyms arc creatures of poetry. This means that, unlike ordinary people, they 
can themselves be prescnted as consistent. Henee their meta-ethieal theorics, their 
cthical retleetions, and their actual existence can be, unlike ours, a consistent whole. 
So their understanding of the ethical may correspond perfectly on the Icvcl of th.eory 
\Vith their existence in practice. This is why corruption of consciousness can be 
exhibited in the pseudonymous works as a consequence of corruption of will. 
However, even if there is a Christian judgement on the ethical existence, it is in 
no sense "objective". There are at least three reasons for this. First, according to 
Kierkegaard Christianity is essentially a matter of faith and, 1 would add, a gift of 
grace. Now the pseudonyms too sometimes say that Christianity is a matter of faith. 
But they mean that it is a paradox that cannot possibly be understood, but must be 
bclicved. For Kierkegaard himself, on the other hand, it means that although 
Christian doctrine can be understood, it can be understood only by one who believes 
iL This is not, however, "objective", since it lies beyond the limits of ail possible 
philosophical systems. Second, if the Christian stand point were objective, it would be 
capable of being set beside the other stand points in su ch a way as to permit 
comparative judgements of conceptual and existential adcquacy. But this is impos-
sible: the pre-Christian and Christian positions are incommensurable. And third, 
although Kierkegaard insists with Anselm that Christian faith can be understood, it 
can he understood only from within. So the Christian judgement on existence can be 
intelligibly made only by one who is himse/f a Christian. 
Hcre we can ask again: Why is Kierkegaard silent in his religious works about 
the cthical life and ail that goes with it? It is because the Christian judgcment is that 
the cthical is corrupt. But this judgement can be uttered only from a position of 
authority such as Kierkegaard never pretended to. He claimed only the kind of 
authority which allowcd him, as an individual, to speak out against Establishment 
Christianity. So, lacking the required form of religious authority, he could not say in 
public what he believed about public forms of life. And it is precise/y part of his 
attaek that those possessing such authority were not using it to speak out against the 
un-Christianness of Danish Christendom. 
IV 
Besides the idea of the ethical presented in the pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard 
also gives us under his own name a series of analyses of elemcnts of a Christian cthies. 
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1 do not want ta discuss this here, only to point out that it is totally distinct from any 
concept of the ethical we find in the pseudonyms. The two fundamental "ethical" 
duties we find stressed in the religious works are obedience to authority and charity. 
The Christian life itself is summarized in the categories of following, imitating, and 
witnessing. These ideas have no analogues in the ethical life; nor is any of them 
original ta Kierkegaard. 
From the Christian standpoint the ethical existence has nothing "ethical" about 
il. 1 do not mean that Kierkegaard thought il impossible for an unbeliever to lead a 
life which is recognisably Christian. 1 am sure he allowed for grace and true virtue 
outside - or even inside - Christendom. Equally we should allow that an individual 
who is and who thinks of himself as leading an ethical life may in fact be living a 
ChrIStian life. A man can be a "knight of faith" without knowing it. 1 mean, rather, 
that the truly ethical life is grounded in the consciousness of sin and grace, and the 
reality of grace and faith, nothing of which can be present except per accidens in a 
non-Christian ethics. 
We find, then, two absolutely different notions of ethics in Kierkegaard's 
corpus. One is a Christian ethics, upon which he reflects and discourses for a 
Christian audience. The other is a set of modern pagan ethical systems, presented by 
imaginary characters for an audience which, whether or not it believes itself to be 
Christian, is mistaken in its idea of Christianity. Kierkegaard himself assigns ethics to 
the category of edification. This is easy to apply to his religious writings, not so easy 
for the pseudonymous ones. About his acknowledged writings we can say the 
following. They are not meant to be edifying just in the sense of upbuilding their 
audience's understanding of Christian doctrine. They are aimed rather at the will, or 
conscience. Kierkegaard assumes that his audience understands more or less clearly 
what is required; and indeed it is not hard to understand. The difficulty, as Saint Paul 
said, is in the doing. However, we must add that where will or conscience is divided 
and unclear, there intellect will be unclear as weil. So ta sorne extent reflection may 
indirectly help to clarify the will. Nonetheless, the theoretical aim of these discourses 
is subordinate to their practical aim. 
How precisely did Kierkegaard, writing as a Christian, mean his pseudonymous 
works ta be edifying? His own answer was that he wanted to show his contemporaries 
how ta become true Christians, instead of aesthetes or philosophers; and that he also 
wanted to show them how difficult this was. But this explanation is not really 
satisfactory. For by hypothesis the intended audience for the pseudonymous works is 
not Christian. SA the realities of the Christian experience and life could not be 
intelligible, and could not be made intelligible, to them. Then the idea of becoming a 
Christian could not be intelligible either ; and there is no dialectical path [rom natural 
reason ta faith. Further, there is nothing theoretical about becoming a Christian; 
there is no way (for Kierkegaard) of becoming a Christian except by the gift of faith. 
And that is free, not the reward of the individual's works. Shall we say, then, that 
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works are a massive negative elenchus of the modern 
consciousness and existence? If sa, its audience might le am three things: [irst, that if 
they think they are Christians they are in alllikelihood mistaken ; second, that if they 
want to become Christians they cannot do so merely by leading lives which are 
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ethical according to contemporary social and philosophical standards; and third, 
that in any case these modes of ethical existence make demands which cannot be 
naturally fulfilled, 
Even so, it is still not clear what Kierkegaard thought his pseudonymous work, 
could achieve, Remember that his most comistent judgement on his contemporanes 
was tha! they had lost passion and substituted for il a self-decciving retlection. 
"Edification" in this context must mean primarily the resto[ation of pa.l'.\iun to 
human existence. But how can this be done? The pseudonymous works, highly 
reflective themselves, arc aimed at their audience's powers of ref1ection. But, as 
Kierkegaard should have realised, they would mercly feed into this universal 
ref1eetivity. They would give people more to chatter about, more intcresting ways l)f 
avoiding action and eommitment. And surely this is preeisely what has happened to 
Kierkegaard? 1 suggest, moreover, that one reason why it has happened is that the 
pseudonyms themselves arc not merely refleetive personae, but chatterers. Kierke-
gaard's whole procedure, then, was highly risky, since if \vriting for an audience 
which tends to chatter, it must be risky to try to get them to see this and stop it by 
ofTering them a series of portraits of virtuoso chatterers. The risk is that the audience 
may be fascinated, not edified. 
Suppose, speculatively, that passion is a constant clement of human being, 
present whether or not it is acknowledged. And suppose that des pair is a natural 
concomitant of certain forms of human existence, and is itself in fact one expression 
of passion. Then we may interpret the ret1ectivity which issues in illusion and self-
deceit as a natural human response to the pressure of despair, and so a distorted but 
still intelligible way in which passion is expressing itsclf. Now if an individu al in this 
condition can be got to reHect still more profoundly and acutely, he may be brought 
to awareness of his own des pair. At the same time, he will become partially awarc of 
the reasons why he has suppressed this despair, and aware that his ret1ectivity was a 
response to this suppression. Ali the while he is also becoming aware of the deep 
reasons why he has been in des pair. But this process must affect not only 11Is 
understanding but also his passion. For up to this point his passion has been, 50 to 
speak, thrown into the project of suppressing his despair in a substituted self-
delusion. And now it is partially freed from this project. Hence it can be utilised by 
the individual himself in a mode of existence which is not wholly and essentially 
despairing. 
Now that paragraph contains a cru de account, l think, of the psychiatrie 
process; it also gives a crude account of something central to Kierkcgaard's thought 
and literary activity. And it is the only scheme of ideas which 1 can at present conccive 
to give sense to the ethical drive of his pseudonymous writings. Notice that in saying 
this l am assuming something about the idea of the ethical: namely, that self-
understanding is central ta any ethical life, that no way of life can be counted ethical 
unless self-understanding constitutes a central and conscious aim for the individual. 
However, su ch a theory does not of course guarantee the success of Kierkegaard's 
religious enterprise, any more than it guarantees the success of any particular 
psychiatric process. In each case, succcss depends on a factor external to what is 
offercd the individual; the individual's own will to be cured. 
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